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Bell gave the now standard definition of a local hidden variable theory and showed that such
theories cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics without violating his “free will”
criterion: experimenters’ measurement choices can be assumed to be uncorrelated with properties
of the measured system prior to measurement.
An alternative is considered here: a probabilistic theory of hidden variables underlying quantum
mechanics could be statistically local, in the sense that it supplies global configuration probabilities
which are defined by expressions involving only local terms. This allows Bell correlations without
relying on either a conspiracy theory in which prior common causes correlate the system state with
experimenters’ choices or a reverse causation principle in which experimenters’ choices affect the
earlier system states. In particular, there is no violation of the free will criterion. It gives a different
perspective on Bell correlations, in which the puzzle is not that apparently non-local correlations
should emerge from rules involving local quantities, but rather that we do not see more general
non-local correlations that allow paradox-immune forms of superluminal signalling.
2 On leave from DAMTP, University of Cambridge, Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EW, U.K.
I. A LAMENT
Many important concepts in quantum foundations are misleadingly named:
• The measurement problem is not the problem of understanding precisely what a measurement is — something
which needn’t be, and probably isn’t, specified in the fundamental theory of nature — but the problem of
finding a precise mathematical or physical characterisation of the sample space on which quantum probabilities
are defined.
• Hidden variables are hidden in the sense that the quantum formalism conceals them, but, as Bell emphasized,
certainly should not be supposed to be hidden from us, since they are meant to define the reality we experience.
And Bell’s own preferred term, beable, has a metaphysically confusing connotation of a not necessarily actualised
potential for existence. This would seem to make sense for the values of suitable variables — only one value is
realised out of many possibilities — but not for the variables themselves: nonetheless, Bell intended the latter.
Better terms for quantities parametrising the sample space which solves the measurement problem would be
existents (Shimony’s term [2]) or perhaps real variables.
• Bell’s free will criterion [3] conflicts with some widely held views of what it means to be able to incorporate
free will into a physical theory — and Bell’s response to critics explains that he did not actually intend to
express a view on the problem of free will. Free will, as Bell used it, is no more than a convenient shorthand
term. A theory satisfies the free will criterion if it allows us to justify treating the measurement settings as
independent variables to those characterising the state of the microscopic system (typically, a pair of separated
entangled particles) being measured. This need not mean that the theory admits your, or anybody’s, favourite
notion of free will. Conversely, as Price emphasizes [4], a theory which fails to satisfy the free will criterion may
nonetheless be compatible with sensible definitions of free will.
• Finally, quantum non-locality is a confusingly oxymoronic phrase. Quantum field theories — the best version of
quantum theory we have — do satisfy a precise locality condition: operators with support in space-like separated
regions commute. What the term is (or should be) meant to signify is that quantum theory is not locally causal
under Bell’s definitions — but quantum non-(local causality) is too clumsy.
What to do? Using non-standard terms, or inventing new ones, makes life difficult for readers. So I will use the
standard terms, with these criticisms understood.
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II. SOME MOTIVATION
It seems to me that all our difficulties in quantum foundations stem first from the measurement problem, and then
from the fact that the obvious ways of tackling the measurement problem are hard to reconcile with special relativity
and/or reality.
Probably this is because quantum theory is wrong, and the insolubility of the measurement problem is a symptom.
Just possibly, another interpretation of quantum theory might do the trick.
Either way, there’s a case for carefully re-examining the conventional lines of argument, looking for gaps and trying
to find scope for something new. Maybe there’s also a case for giving up and waiting for experiment to give us a clue,
but I’ll resist that temptation here. Instead, I want to describe a different way of thinking about hidden variables,
which at least sheds a different light on Bell correlations.
III. LATTICE MODELS IN STATISTICAL PHYSICS
To statistical physicists, lattice models are mathematical idealizations. Many quantities of interest in statistical
physics are relatively insensitive to the details of the microphysics, and many distinct systems and models may belong
to the same universality class, with essentially the same properties. So, if a well chosen lattice model reproduces the
bulk properties and correlation functions observed in an experimental sample, this need not imply that the model
even approximately describes the system’s microphysics.
I want here to use some standard definitions of lattice statistical physics in an unfamiliar way. First, I note that
lattice-like models make sense as fundamental theories in their own right, rather than as phenomenological models
attempting to capture some of the properties of a more fundamental theory. Then I want to consider the possibility
that something rather like a lattice model could be a fundamental theory of microphysics, giving a hidden variable
theory explanation of Bell correlations.
Consider the two-dimensional Ising model on a square lattice (Figure 1). A “spin” variable si ∈ {−1, 1} is attached
to each site i. The Hamiltonian
H =
∑
(i,j) nearest neighbours
(1− sisj) ,
includes only interactions between horizontally or vertically adjacent spins. For any possible configuration of spins
S = {si : i a lattice site}, we have a probability weight
p(S) = exp(−CH) ,
where C is a constant (at fixed temperature). The idealised system represented by the Ising model will always be
found in some legitimate spin configuration, and the probability of finding it in the configuration S is
Prob(S) =
p(S)∑
all configurations S′ p(S
′)
.
Note that the model is thus statistically local, in the sense that if two spin configurations S and S′ differ only on a
region R, the ratio
Prob(S)
Prob(S′)
can be calculated purely from the values of the si and s
′
i within the region R, together with those of their nearest
neighbours. That is, if S and S′ differ only locally, the ratio of their probabilities can be calculated from local
quantities.
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Figure 1: An Ising model spin configuration
Now, the main point. The Ising model, as just described, could be interpreted as a fundamental theory. Imagine a
world in which, say, a particular type of crystal has the property that its surfaces are perfect square arrays of atoms,
in which each atom has an asymmetric feature which define an orientation, and in which the orientation is always
perpendicular to the surface, either pointing outward (+1) or inward (−1). Imagine further that the orientations are
stable — we cannot change them — and can be examined by powerful microscopes, and that a plentiful supply of
crystals is available.
Then it makes sense, as a hypothesis, to suppose that the atomic orientations are randomly configured, with
probabilities defined by the Ising model (on the finite lattice defined by the crystal surface). The theory can be
tested: examining large numbers of crystals will reveal whether or not the data are statistically consistent with the
theory. And it need not be a phenomenological theory; it could be fundamental. It could simply be that nature
has fixed these unchanging orientation configurations, not through some underlying dynamics whose end result is
described by the Ising model, but from the beginning, by a random choice which (like the randomness of quantum
measurements, according to the orthodox view) has no underlying explanation.
Obviously, this imaginary Ising-world is not much like ours, in which crystals form and decompose, atoms don’t
behave classically, their configurations and spin states aren’t fixed, and everything is (as far as we presently understand)
ultimately described by quantum dynamics. But conceptually the Ising theory of crystals in Ising-world makes sense.
It is testable in much the same way as quantum theory is, and it includes a simplifying principle — statistical locality
— which makes it much easier to test: it suffices to look at orientation configurations in local regions of crystal
surfaces. And, given our other assumptions about Ising-world, there is no compelling reason — nothing analogous to
the measurement problem — to think Ising theory must be incomplete.
IV. MINKOWSKI SPACE TRAJECTORY MODELS
Let us suppose that underlying quantum theory there is some theory in which real particles follow definite trajecto-
ries through spacetime. To simplify things, take space-time to be two-dimensional, with a discrete lattice structure at
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microscopic scales (Figure 2). The lattice edges are lightlike, and so the discussion is restricted to massless particles,
which travel along the lattice edges. Also, for the purposes of this discussion, macroscopic experimental apparatus
will be treated as qualitatively distinct from microscopic particles, so that we are allowed to consider apparatus set
up somewhere in spacetime without having to describe it as a collection of microscopic particles, each following their
own trajectories through the lattice.
All of these simplifications are meant to be provisional rather than fundamental. The idea is to set up the standard
discussion of Bell correlations, and then find a new way of looking at them, without obscuring things with too many
technicalities.
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Figure 2: Two-dimensional Minkowski space trajectory lattice
Figure 3 shows a standard Bell experiment on a pair of entangled massless particles, “photons”, with one extra
feature — lightlike trajectories along the lattice edges have been included. Though this looks like a standard beam
path picture, the trajectories here are hidden variables: the picture is meant to be interpreted as saying that the
photons really did travel along the paths depicted — something we will eventually have to show is consistent with
the model we produce. The space-time trajectories of the classical measuring apparatuses won’t affect the discussion,
and are omitted.
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Figure 3: A Bell experiment
x+ctx-ct
To further simplify things — since we cannot use photon polarizations in two dimensions — let us assume that
the measurements are perfect von Neumann measurements of an internal degree of freedom, “spin”, with the photons
initially in the singlet state of a pair of spin 1/2 particles.1 According to quantum theory, these von Neumann
measurements do not affect the form of the photon wave packet, assuming (let’s) that the spatial and spin degrees
of freedom are unentangled. It seems reasonable to postulate that, in the hidden variable model we are building,
the photon trajectories will also be unaffected by such measurements. For instance, after a measurement of spin in
the measurement basis defined by vector a, the apparatus records the answer a or −a, the photon emerges in the
corresponding spin eigenstate, and its trajectory continues unaltered.
The aim now is to reproduce Bell correlations by a statistically local lattice-like model involving photon trajectories,
while respecting Bell’s free will criterion. We will want to attach further hidden variable degrees of freedom to
the photon trajectories, so that the spin measurements become relevant to the hidden variable model. The free
will criterion requires that no hidden variables at points before the measurements should be correlated with the
measurement choices. This, together with locality, means that the photons’ states before the measurements cannot
explain the correlations: we need rules involving events after the measurements.
We can ensure a relevant post-measurement event if the photons are forced to meet again, and that can be done,
without violating statistical locality, as follows. First, we give a small but non-zero probability weight to trajectory
segments in which a photon’s direction switches: this allows the two photons to meet after the measurements. Second,
we choose rules that assign probability zero to the event that the photons propagate forever, and non-zero probability
weight to the event that two photon trajectories annihilate when they meet. Together these ensure that photons must
eventually undergo pair annihilation. The first of these can be arranged by assigning probability weight of (1− ǫ) to
a vertex in which the photon continues in the same direction, and weight ǫ to a vertex in which it switches (Figure
4); here ǫ > 0 is chosen to be small enough that (1− ǫ)N ≈ 1, where N is the number of lattice links a photon would
traverse in the largest scale Bell experiment carried out to date.
1The scare quotes around “photon” and “spin” are left implicit from now on.
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Figure 4: Probability Weights for Free Progagation
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In choosing rules for a pair annihilation, we need to make sure that the originally entangled photons meet and
mutually annihilate each other, and not other photons. This we do by introducing a hidden variable label which only
the entangled pair share, and allowing annihilation only between pairs which share the same label. Finally, we enforce
the correct correlations by fiat, by adding a further label which records a photon’s measurement outcome, and by
making the probability weight for the annihilation event depend appropriately on these labels (Figure 5).
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Bell Particles after Measurements
Figure 5: Probability Weight for Recombining
particle from pair i after
measurement result a
particle from pair j after
measurement result b
Probability weight = δij (1− a.b)/2
①
①
①
To summarise: we’ve arranged rules so that the entangled photons from pair i do the following: (i) with high
probability, propagate linearly from source to detectors, (ii) after measurement, each eventually undergo one or more
changes of direction, (iii) with probability one, eventually meet up and annihilate. (Figure 6)
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Figure 6: a typical trajectory description of a Bell experiment in the model
A B
annihilation vertex V
source S
The trajectory from A to V carries hidden variables i (pair label) and a (measurement result)
The trajectory from B to V carries hidden variables i (pair label) and b (measurement result)
The trajectories from S to A and B carry hidden variable i (pair label)
result a
measurement of spin: measurement of spin:①①
V. DISCUSSION
All we’ve done, of course, is rewrite the standard quantum correlations into ad hoc rules, in such a way that we
can formally attach hidden variables characterising the measurement results to the photon paths after measurement,
and formally account for the correlations as deriving from a rule attached to a pair annihilation event that must take
place in the far future. What was the point of that?
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The point, as I see it, is to underline how difficult it is to draw absolutely watertight conclusions about the form of
realist theories underlying quantum theory, even if we accept that such theories should respect special relativity and
should incorporate some form of locality, and even after decades of analysis of the implications of Bell experiments.
To recapitulate:
We can agree with Bell that any theory which postulates common causes in the past which systematically affect
experimenter and system, in such a way as to always produce Bell correlations, is likely to be unbelievably conspir-
atorial. But, as Price has so carefully and persuasively argued [4], this leaves open the possibility of theories which
invoke some form of advanced action principle, by which experimenters’ choices affect the earlier state of the system.
As Price notes, although such theories would violate Bell’s free will criterion, they would not necessarily rule out free
will per se, at least according to some reasonable definitions. And they would not contradict the notion of effective
freedom which underlay Bell’s definition, nor invoke the same type of implausible conspiracy as a common cause
explanation.
Still, there is (at the very least) an aesthetic case for the free will criterion. But even if the criterion is accepted, the
discussion isn’t closed. The models described above respect the free will criterion and they invoke no complex common
cause hypothesis. They incorporate a respectable form of locality. Yet they give — in the simple case considered —
a consistent explanation of Bell experiments.
That said, there is, of course, much to be said against the sort of ideas outlined above. The rules proposed
are entirely ad hoc, transparently constructed precisely in order to reproduce quantum correlations. They could
be generalised to cover more complicated entanglement experiments, but only — it would seem — at the price of
introducing even more ad hoc and unwieldy rules. They require, in particular, that every hidden particle trajectory
carries a record of its past history — which particles it was originally entangled with, and which measurements were
carried out on it — arbitrarily far into the future. It is hard to see, methodologically speaking, what the point of
pursuing this idea would be, unless some independent principle could be found to explain why the annihilation vertex
weights should take the form necessary to reproduce quantum correlations. And where could such a principle come
from?
In fact, any type of correlation, including those which allow superluminal signalling, could consistently be attached
to the annihilation vertex. Why should such correlations be excluded? If we were to take the basic idea of these
models seriously, we would be led to ask why the non-local correlations we see in nature are so tame as to preclude
superluminal signalling. That this would lead to paradoxes is not a valid answer. Consistent probabilistic rules for
global configurations cannot produce a logical contradiction. Attempts to set up a paradoxical causal loop fail. This is
essentially because the probability of a successful superluminal signal is — even in isolation — always at least slightly
less than one, and the probability of a sequence of signals succeeding is not generally the product of the values of the
individual probabilities of success if the relevant signalling devices were isolated [5].
Moreover, the model involved several breathtaking simplifications, which would need to be removed if the idea were
to be taken seriously. (Can we eliminate the need for an underlying lattice, or ensure that the model has a Lorentz
invariant continuum limit? What about rules for massive particles, and for other types of measurement? And how
do we build a coherent model that describes macroscopic measuring devices in terms of microscopic particles?)
Nonetheless, despite all these flaws, I think there is some interest in this rewriting of the standard story. It seems
to show that the conventional wisdom about Bell’s “free will” criterion is not quite right: realist, local and Lorentz
invariant theories can respect the criterion and yet reproduce quantum correlations. And it does so by identifying
a class of realist models — probabilistic models in which the probability of a configuration depends on a product of
local terms — which standard discussions of Bell’s theorem neglect. There are, as just noted, many arguments against
taking seriously the idea that nature is actually described by these models. But the arguments are different from the
arguments against other unorthodox ideas about hidden variables and Bell correlations, and worth thinking through,
just for that reason.
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